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Core issues:	Whether the rights protected by *Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights* were engaged by the foreseeable consequences for health or welfare of removal from the United Kingdom pursuant to an immigration decision, where such removal does not violate *Article 3 European Convention on Human Rights*.
Facts:	F1 Mr Razgar was a twenty six year old asylum seeker from Iraq. He was arrested, imprisoned and tortured for two and a half years in Iraq until he bribed his way out in 1997. He then travelled to Germany via Turkey, where he was detained. He arrived in the UK on 22 February 1999 and claimed asylum.F2 The Secretary of State proposed to remove Mr Razgar to Germany under the provisions of the *Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communities (15 June 1990) OJ 1990 L254, entered into force on 1 September 1997* (‘Dublin Convention’). Mr Razgar challenged such removal on the grounds that it would violate his rights under *Article 8 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 1950) 213 UNTS 222; 312 ETS 5, entered into force 3 September 1953* (‘ECHR’). The Secretary of State certified under *Article 72(2)(a) Immigration and Asylum Act, 1999 (United Kingdom)* that the claim for asylum was manifestly unfounded. F3 Mr Razgar and his consultant psychiatrist, Dr Sathananthan, stated that Mr Razgar was suffering from severe depression and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, as a result of his treatment under Saddam Hussein’s regime and the racist abuse he suffered whilst in detention in Germany. F4 Mr Razgar applied for permission to seek judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision to remove, but the judge refused permission and an application for permission to appeal was in the end discontinued. F5 There were two stages to the present cases before it came to the House of Lords where Mr Razgar challenged the Secretary of State’s certification. *R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Decision at first instance, [2002] EWHC 2554, 20 November 2002* and *R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Appeal of decision at first instance, [2003] EWCA Civ 840, [2003] Imm AR 529, 19 June 2003*.F6 Mr Razgar then initiated the present application to quash the Secretary of State’s certification that asylum must be denied. If the certification stood it would have precluded any appeal by Mr Razgar against his removal from the country. 
Held:	H1 As per *Bensaid v United Kingdom, Merits, App no 44599/98; IHRL 2982 (ECHR 2001), 6 February 2001* (‘Bensaid’), reliance could be placed, in principle, on *Article 8 ECHR* to resist an expulsion decision even where the main emphasis was not on the severance of family and social ties which the applicant had enjoyed in the expelling country but on the consequences for his mental health of removal to the receiving country. The rights protected by *Article 8 ECHR* could be engaged by the foreseeable consequences for health of removal from the UK pursuant to an immigration decision, even where such removal did not violate *Article 3 ECHR*, if the facts relied on by the applicant were sufficiently strong. [paras 9-10]H2 In a case where removal was resisted on the basis of *Article 8 ECHR*, the reviewing court had to assess whether the proposed removal amounted to an interference by a public authority with the exercise of the applicant’s right to respect for his private life, and whether such interference was in accordance with law, necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the legitimate public end sought to be achieved. [paras 16-7]H3 In this case, question 1 and 2 were answered in the affirmative. The question of gravity of consequences should be properly answered in the affirmative because a decision to remove Mr Razgar might result in the taking of his own life. The decision to remove would amount to an interference with *Article 8 ECHR*. [paras 22-23]H4 Lord Bingham stated that the questions of legality in question 3 and necessity in question 4 would have been answered in the affirmative by an adjudicator. [para 24] H5 The crux of the case was whether the decision to remove was proportionate in the light of the facts; whether a fair balance was struck between the right of Razgar under *Article 8 ECHR* and the immigration policy of the UK. However the Secretary of State and the judge in the Court of Appeal, *R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Appeal of decision at first instance, [2003] EWCA Civ 840*, did not consider question of proportionality. There remained the possibility that Mr Razgar’s rights under *Article 8 ECHR* might be violated if he were returned to Germany. The Secretary of State erred in not considering Article 8 ECHR in arriving at the decision to certify this claim to be manifestly unfounded.[para 24] Although not unanimously, the majority of the Appellate Committee members found for Mr Razgar and dismissed the appeal. AHouse ofHouses regards the proportionality of the expulsion, Lord Bingham. Lord Steyn agreeing, stated that if Mr Razgar’s phobia of returning to Germany was genuine and if his account of his previous experience was found to be true then a decision to return Mr Razgar to Germany would violate his rights under *Article 8 ECHR*. [para 25- 26]H6 Lord Carswell, in an individual opinion agreed with the balancing approach to answering the proportionality question proposed by Lord Bingham. Lord Carswell also dismissed the appeal on the reasoning that Mr Razgar’s *Article 8 ECHR* right was not considered, and as an adjudicator, acting reasonably, might not uphold the decision to remove, the lack of consideration paid by the Secretary of State to *Article 8 ECHR* in reaching the decision was impermissible. [Para 77] H7 Lord Walker, dissenting disagreed with the application of the law to the facts in this case. [para 27] Although he noted that the evidence presented as to the appellant’s experiences and their effect on his mental and physical condition, if found to be truthful, provoked deep concern and sympathy, he went on to add that such experiences and their effects were unfortunately not exceptional. [para 29] He further added that there was no general human right to physical and good mental health. [para 34]H8 Baroness Hale considered the distinction between domestic cases and foreign cases to be vital to the present case. In her opinion, the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence, guaranteed by *Article 8 ECHR*, is a qualified right which may be interfered with if this is necessary in order to pursue a legitimate aim. What may happen in the foreign country is therefore relevant to the proportionality of the proposed expulsion. Mr Razgar’s degree of social integration in the UK is nowhere near strong enough to make this a ‘domestic’ case. This is a ‘foreign’ case in which the UK’s responsibility is only indirectly engaged as a result of what might happen to him if removed. The fact that the same treatment may not be available in Germany is not sufficient evidence to suggest that the medication is essential to prevent a serious deterioration. The risk of suicide is therefore capable of engaging *Articles 2*, *3*, and *8 ECHR*.
Analysis:	A1 The meat of this case, as summed up by Richards J in the Court of Appeal, ‘was that the claimant’s mental health would suffer serious a decline in Germany by reason, in particular, of the lack of appropriate treatment; it would have to deteriorate to the point where his condition was acute, that is to say where he became a suicide risk, before treatment could be assured. By contrast if he stayed in the UK he could expect to receive appropriate treatment and to make progress. [para 61]A2 The court considered, in light of Strasbourg jurisprudence, whether removal from a country to another country where comparable medical facilities were not available amounted to a violation of *Article 8 ECHR*. Normally, challenges to deportation orders have been dealt with by the ECHR under *Article 3 ECHR*, which admittedly sets a high threshold.  Nonetheless, should removal from the UK violate *Article 8 ECHR* then this too could prevent removal from the UK. In *D v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 423* the court held that removal cannot be resisted merely on the ground that medical treatment or facilities are better or more accessible in the removing country than in that to which the applicant is to be removed. In *Henao v The Netherlands, Decision, App no 13669/03, unreported, 24 June 2003* considered deportation which would result in lack of medical treatment but the case was argued solely on *Article 3 ECHR* grounds and dismissed. The House of Lords later found in *R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator, Appeal decision, [2004] UKHL 26; ILDC 103 (UK 2004), 17 June 2004* and *Do v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Appeal decision, [2004] UKHL 26; ILDC 103 (UK 2004), 17 June 2004* that removal cannot be resisted simply because medical treatment or facilities are better or more accessible in the removing country than in the country to which the applicant will be removed.[para 4] The convention is directed to the protection of fundamental human rights, not the conferral of individual advantages or benefits. [para 4]A3 The bedrock of Mr Razgar’s case was *Bensaid*. In that case the Court first considered Bensaid’s claim under *Article 3 ECHR*, as a means to block removal taking into account the exceptional facts of *D v United Kingdom, Judgment, Merits and just satisfaction, App no 30240/96, 2 May 1997*, and then considered the applicant’s complain based on *Article 8 ECHR*. In those cases the court held that removal from the UK to a country where medical treatment was available did not violate Article 8 ECHR. Even if there was interference it would be justified on the basis of *Article 8(2) ECHR* on the basis that immigration policy was necessary for the economic well-being of the country and the prevention of disorder and crime. In theory therefore *Article 8 ECHR* could be applied to prevent removal so long as the facts were of sufficient seriousness. A4 In light of the facts surrounding Mr Razgar’s case, the question is whether the quashing of the Secretary of State certification of Mr Razgar’s claim as manifestly unfounded was correct? Mr Razgar and his psychiatrist, Dr Sathananthan, argued that removal from the UK would cause psychological stress. The Secretary of State acknowledged this negative impact on Mr Razgar but did not accept, on all of the evidence submitted, that the risk to Mr Razgar reached that level of severity of physical or mental suffering as to warrant departing from his usual practice. He also stated that he was satisfied that Mr Razgar’s human rights would be fully respected in Germany. A5 Lord Walker also argued that the Court of Appeal and Lord Bingham had erred when it compared the levels of psychiatric care available in the UK and Germany. The Court of Appeal and Lord Bingham held that under *Bensaid *, *R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator* and *Do v Immigration Appeal Tribunal* if the mental health of the applicant were to deteriorate in Germany then the claim for asylum based on *Article 8 ECHR* would be engaged. Lord Walker stated ‘even in the most enlightened host country asylum seekers often have to deal with bleak accommodation or even loss of liberty, public hostility and material deprivation, and these ... naturally lead to anxiety, depression and feelings of hopelessness’. [para 37] It appears therefore that there is an inherent tension in the jurisprudence between a willingness to engage Article 8 ECHR should circumstances be sufficiently serious and a reluctance to compare levels of human rights protection in member states.A7
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